




























Outcome research confirming the salutary effects of mindfulness-based interventions has 
proliferated in the last fifteen years. In contrast, there has been very little research into 
intra-individual factors that may enhance or inhibit mindfulness. The present study 
examined a proposal by Brown, Ryan and Creswell (2007a) that external contingent self-
worth may act as an inhibiting factor of mindfulness. Undergraduate participants 
performed two reading tasks; one under neutral conditions and one under the influence of 
an academic ego-threat. Momentary mindfulness levels were measured retrospectively 
following both reading tasks. It was expected that levels of academic competence 
contingent self-worth would predict changes in momentary mindfulness levels between 
the ego-threat and neutral condition, and, in addition, that worry would mediate the 
relationship. The study findings supported both hypotheses. The theoretical implications 
of the study are discussed in relation to the salience of self-investment in present moment 
events as a controlling variable of levels of momentary mindfulness. 
 








Mindfulness is usually conceptualised in terms of enhanced attention to, and awareness 
of, current experience or present reality; such awareness is further characterised by 
curiosity, openness and acceptance (Brown & Ryan, 2003). Mindfulness may be 
contrasted with ‘mindlessness’ wherein attention is directed away from present-moment 
experience, such as when fantasising about the future or ruminating about the past. While 
it is possible to become more mindful via formal training programmes that typically last 
about eight weeks (Kabat-Zinn, 1990), naturally-occurring individual differences in 
mindfulness have also been shown to exist (Brown & Ryan, 2003).  
   Outcome studies reporting the benefits of mindfulness-based interventions, across a 
range of clinical and non-clinical populations, have proliferated in recent years (Baer 
2003; Grossman, Niemann, Schmidt & Walach, 2004; Hoffmann, Sawyer, Witt & Oh, 
2010). Explanatory accounts of such benefits (e.g., Baer, 2003; Teasdale, Moore, 
Hayhurst et al., 2002) suggest that mindfulness promotes a “shift in cognitive set to a 
decentred mode of processing in which the individual is no longer personally identified 
with mental (and external) events, but rather relates to them in a wider context or field of 
awareness” (Teasdale et al., 2002, p.276). In essence, events are registered directly as 
they occur and no additional conceptual elaboration takes place (Brown & Ryan, 2003). 
This decentred mode of processing may be distinguished from a conceptually-driven 
alternative: instead of experiencing the present moment directly, thought-generated 
accounts of it are attended to instead (Brown, Ryan & Creswell, 2007a). Various forms of 
cognitive filtering are applied to such accounts before they reach awareness (Brown, 
Ryan, Creswell & Niemiec, 2008). Shifting from a conceptually-driven mode of 
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processing to a decentred one is thought to underpin the beneficial effects of mindfulness 
training in three ways: first, by increasing willingness to tolerate uncomfortable emotions 
(Hayes, Strosahl & Wilson, 2011); second, by reducing emotional reactivity to negative 
emotional events (Kabat-Zinn, 1990); and third, by inhibiting habitual response patterns 
when more flexible responding is optimal for the situation (Bishop, Lau, Shapiro, et al., 
2004). Hitherto, there has been a dearth of research into the factors that maintain 
individuals in a conceptually-driven mode of processing and that inhibit them from 
shifting to a decentred mode (Brown et al., 2007a). The current study sets out to address 
this significant gap in the literature.  
   An important distinction between the decentred and conceptually-driven processing 
modes is emphasised in Buddhist accounts of mindfulness (e.g., Brazier, 2003). 
Basically, the conceptually-driven mode is primarily invested in evaluating internal and 
external events in relation to their impact on the self, whereas the decentred mode 
registers and discerns events without engaging in such self-referent evaluation. Rather 
than being a real entity in its own right, the ‘self’ referred to is posited to be a constructed 
self-image or mental model formed from conceptual elaborations on life experiences and 
shaped by the social and cultural contexts in which the individual operates (Brown et al., 
2008). Consistent with this account, Brown et al. (2007a) have argued that contexts 
which activate ego-involvement will facilitate an individual’s tendency to engage in 
conceptually-driven processing at the expense of decentred processing. Ego-involvement 
can be described as “an internal state in which a person’s self-esteem is contingent on 
certain (external) outcomes - for example, achieving a certain status, acquiring a certain 
object or being positively evaluated in a certain way” (Brown et al, 2007b; p.279). 
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Crocker, Luhtanen, Cooper & Bouvrette (2003) refer to these contexts as ‘self-worth 
contingencies’. By evoking a conceptually-driven processing mode, these self-worth 
contingencies are hypothesised to inhibit the emergence of mindfulness (Brown et al., 
2007a). This claim has attracted some correlational support (Brown & Ryan, 2003; 
Brown & Kasser, 2005) but evidence of a causal link has yet to be established. 
   The present study set out to test the above account by focusing on the external domain 
of academic competence in undergraduate students, one of seven sources of self-worth 
identified by Crocker et al (2003). Participants’ momentary mindfulness levels were 
measured on two occasions: under a no-threat condition and under an academic ego-
threat condition. The latter was designed to activate academic competence self-worth 
contingencies. It was predicted that higher levels of academic self-worth contingency 
would be associated with greater reductions in momentary mindfulness from the neutral 
condition to the ego-threat condition (H1).  
   Intermediary processes bridging the anticipated association between academic self-
worth contingencies and reductions in momentary mindfulness under ego-threat can be 
hypothesised from Fennell’s (1997) cognitive model of low-self-esteem. According to the 
model, people develop rules for living in order to cope with negative core beliefs about 
themselves. These rules map onto what Beck (1976) labelled as dysfunctional conditional 
assumptions (McManus, Waite & Shafran, 2009) and are equivalent to self-worth 
contingencies. As long as the terms of the contingency are met, self-esteem may be 
maintained (Fennell & Jenkins, 2004). However, if the contingency’s terms are 
threatened then the core belief becomes activated and anxious preoccupation follows. 
Since anxious thoughts are threatening to the self, the Buddhist account (Brazier, 2003) 
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would suggest that they will be more difficult to decentre from than neutral equivalents. 
Reductions in momentary mindfulness would inevitably follow. Therefore, it may be 
hypothesised that anxious thinking, and in particular worry, will mediate the proposed 
association between academic competence self-worth contingency and mindfulness. This 




The sample comprised mainly of first-year undergraduate students who participated for 
course credits. As the study’s ego-threat relied on participants being deceived into 
believing that their weak performance on a difficult verbal abilities task was indicative of 
poor future academic prospects, participants who did not have English as a first language 
or who were above thirty-five years of age were excluded. The final sample (N = 72) was 
predominantly female (85%) and Caucasian (53%), with most participants aged between 
17 and 21 years.  
 
Design overview 
All participants completed a questionnaire booklet comprising of measures of Academic 
Competence Self-worth Contingency and Worry. They also completed both the ego-
threat and neutral conditions of the study, the order of conditions being counter-balanced. 
Some participants were subjected to the ego-threat first and this was followed by a 
reading task. Immediately thereafter they completed a measure of state mindfulness and 
mood indicating, retrospectively, how they felt during the reading task. They then 
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completed a second reading task and further measures of state mindfulness and mood 
(again indicating their immediate retrospective feelings). Other participants completed a 
reading task first followed by retrospective measures of state mindfulness and mood. 
They then completed the ego-threat condition, a reading task and final measures of state 
mindfulness and mood. Reading material was counterbalanced across condition order. In 
formal terms, the design comprised of one within-participants factor with two levels 
(condition: ego-threat/neutral) and two between-participant factors with two levels each 
(condition presentation order: ego-threat followed by neutral or neutral followed by ego-
threat; reading task presentation order: reading task A followed by reading task B or vice 
versa). The dependent variable was change in state mindfulness experienced during the 
reading tasks from the neutral condition to the ego-threat condition. 
 
Materials 
Academic Competence Self-Worth Contingency 
This was measured using the five-item Academic Competence Subscale of the 
Contingencies of Self-Worth Scale (CSWS; Crocker et al., 2003). Participants rated their 
agreement with each item statement on a seven-point Likert Scale (1 = Strongly Disagree, 
7 = Strongly Agree). A typical item was … My self-esteem gets a boost when I get a good 
grade on an exam or piece of coursework. Higher scores reflected greater levels of 
academic competence self-worth contingency (α = 0.79). The five items were embedded 
among two further subscales of the CSWS, namely God’s Love and Virtue. These filler 




Worry was measured using the 16-item Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer, 
Miller, Metzger & Borkovec, 1990). Participants indicated on a five-point Likert Scale 
how typically each item statement reflected their own experience (1 = Not at all typical, 5 
= Very typical). An example item was … As soon as I finish one task I start to worry 
about everything else I have to do. Higher scores reflected greater levels of trait worry (α 
= 0.92). 
Ego-threat condition  
The ego-threat condition was adapted from Park & Crocker (2004). Participants were 
given written instructions and a ‘test’ paper; the latter was described as a verbal abilities 
test and was attributed to McFarlin and Blascovich (1984). They were deliberately 
misinformed that test scores accurately predicted undergraduate degree performance and 
acceptance onto both postgraduate training courses and employers’ graduate training 
programmes. They were also wrongly informed that the average test score for UK 
university students was 7.5 questions correct out of twelve and 7.8 questions correct in 
their particular institution. They were told they would have five minutes to complete the 
test and that they would be informed of their score shortly thereafter. The test contained 
12 word triads with the task being to identify a fourth related word in each case. Pilot-
testing revealed that three of the word triads could be solved relatively easily whereas the 
remaining nine were virtually insoluble. For example, on one of the easier trials the 
words ‘Shelf’ ‘Read’ and ‘Cook’ were presented and the required answer was ‘Book’. A 
difficult/impossible trial involved presenting word triads such as ‘Win’ ‘Complex’ and 
‘Mine’. Two examples of word triads and their solutions were given at the outset to 
 9
orientate participants to task requirements. On completion, participants’ answer sheets 
were marked by the researcher at the front of the testing room to give the impression that 
participants’ test scores would soon be returned. However, it was assumed that 
participants would be aware that they achieved three correct answers at best and that, in 
line with the study’s preamble, this compared badly with other students’ performance, 
both nationally and locally. 
 Reading tasks   
Participants read one of two short typed articles (Article A or Article B) at their own 
pace. Both articles contained approximately 480 words and were extracted from longer 
pieces in professional forum publications (Article A from Moss (2008) in an optometry 
publication and Article B from Prais (2008) in a legal publication). Both articles had been 
found in pilot testing to be slightly (as opposed to highly) interesting to undergraduate 
Psychology students. 
State mindfulness 
Momentary levels of mindfulness were measured using the five-item state version of the 
Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (State MAAS; Brown & Ryan, 2003) modified to fit 
with the requirements of the current task. Participants were asked to think back on their 
experience of reading the article in the immediately preceding experimental phase and to 
indicate on a seven-point Likert scale the degree to which each item statement reflected 
that experience (0 = Not at all, 6 = Very Much). Example items were … I was rushing 
through the article without being attentive to it; I found it difficult staying focused on the 
article. State mindfulness scores were derived by reverse-scoring the five items. Higher 
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scores reflected higher levels of momentary mindfulness (alphas were 0.84 and 0.88 in 
the neutral and ego-threat conditions, respectively).  
Mood 
Mood was measured using a three-item self-report questionnaire adapted from Park and 
Crocker (2004). Participants were asked to think back on their experience of reading the 
article in the preceding reading task and to indicate on a seven-point Likert scale (0 = Not 
at all, 6 = Very much) the extent to which they felt agreeable (item 1), unhappy (item 2) 
and irritated (item 3) while doing so.  
 
Procedure 
Participants were tested in groups but seated apart and asked not to communicate with 
each other during testing. Questionnaire measures of academic self-worth contingency, 
worry and demographics were completed initially. Once the ego-threat task had been 
completed the participants engaged in one of the reading tasks (while their tests were 
apparently being scored by the experimenter). Before going on to complete the state 
mindfulness and mood measures they were all fully debriefed. They were informed that 
neither the average scores stated, nor the information about the predictive utility of the 
verbal abilities test, was true and that the test had been specifically designed to make it 
extremely difficult to score higher than 3 out of 12. State measures of mindfulness and 
mood pertaining to the preceding reading task were taken directly following the reading 
task in the neutral condition, and following debriefing in the ego-threat condition. The 
ordering of the two study conditions was counterbalanced across test sessions to reduce 
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order effects and the order of presentation of the two articles (A or B) was 
counterbalanced across participants.  
 
Results 
Ego-threat manipulation check  
Because the ego-threat task was explicitly designed to challenge participants’ perceptions 
of their future academic prospects, changes in participants’ mood states (agreeableness, 
unhappiness and irritability) between study conditions were used to assess the 
effectiveness of the academic ego-threat. Given that three comparisons were undertaken, 
a Bonferroni adjustment was made to control for Type 1 error yielding an acceptable 
significance level of  p<0.016. Higher levels of irritability (Cohen’s d= 0.81, t(71)= 6.87, 
p<0.001) and unhappiness (d= 0.89, t(71) =7.62, p<0.001) and lower levels of 
agreeableness (d= 0.49, t(71)= -4.14, p<0.001) were found following the ego-threat 




Table 1 below presents the mean state mindfulness scores of participants categorised by 
condition and the order of presentation of the ego-threat and reading task articles. 
 
                                                         INSERT  
                                                         TABLE 1 
                                                           HERE 
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It may be seen that counterbalancing of conditions was only partially achieved (44 
participants received the ego-threat condition first while 28 participants received it 
second). This imbalance occurred primarily due to more excluded participants being 
present in testing sessions where the neutral condition occurred before the ego-threat 
condition, in comparison to sessions where the ego-threat condition occurred before the 
neutral condition. 
A mixed model ANOVA with one within-participant factor (condition: ego-threat and 
neutral) and two between-participant factors (condition order: ego-threat then neutral or 
vice versa; and article order: article A then article B or vice versa) was subsequently 
conducted to examine the effects of condition, condition order and article order 
presentation on state mindfulness scores. A significant main effect of condition [F(1,68)= 
40.94, p<0.001] was found. Participants experienced higher levels of momentary 
mindfulness in the neutral condition (M = 19.02) compared with the ego-threat condition 
(M = 12.20). Using Cohen’s (1988) guidelines, the effect size was large (Cohen’s 
d=1.00). 
 
There was no significant main effect of condition order on average mindfulness levels 
[F(1,68) = 0.05, n.s.], showing that participants receiving the ego-threat before the first 
reading task did not differ overall on mindfulness levels from participants receiving the 
ego-threat before the second reading task. There was no significant main effect of article 
order on average mindfulness levels across the two conditions [F(1,88)= 2.56, n.s.] 
showing that participants receiving article A did not differ on overall mindfulness levels 
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from participants receiving article B. The two-way interactions between condition and 
condition order [F(1, 68) = 1.83, n.s.), condition and article order [F(1,68) = 0.24, n.s.] 
and condition order and article order [F(1, 68) = 0.09, n.s.], were non-significant. 
Likewise, the three-way interaction between condition, condition order and article order 
[F(1,68)=0.01, n.s.] was non-significant. The analysis shows that momentary mindfulness 
scores in each of the study conditions did not differ as a function of the presentation order 
of the ego-threat and reading task articles. The analysis therefore supports the 
appropriateness of treating threat-related changes in participants’ mindfulness scores 
between neutral and ego-threat conditions as a single measure independently of condition 
order and article presentation order. So as to reflect the direction of the main effect of 
condition, this measure is referred to henceforth as threat-related reduction in 
mindfulness, corresponding to mindfulness levels in the neutral condition (as a baseline) 
minus mindfulness levels in the ego-threat condition. 
 
Tests of association were subsequently conducted between threat-related reduction in 
mindfulness and academic contingent self-worth and demographic variables. As 
predicted, a significant positive association was found between threat-related reductions 
in mindfulness and academic contingent self-worth (r=.32, p< 0.01). Threat-related 
reductions in mindfulness were found to be unrelated to age (Spearman’s rho = -.22, n.s.), 
gender (t(70)=1.73, n.s.) or ethnicity (t(70)=1.64, n.s.). 
A regression analysis was subsequently carried out with academic contingent self-worth 
as the unique predictor variable and threat-related reductions in state mindfulness as the 
dependent variable. Academic contingent self-worth accounted for a significant amount 
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of variance in threat-related reductions in mindfulness (R2= .10, adjusted R2 = .09, ß=.32, 
p<0.01). With higher levels of the former predicting greater levels of the latter, the 
study’s main hypothesis (H1) was supported.  
 
Test of mediating role of worry (H2) 
A test for the mediating role of worry between academic contingent self-worth and 
threat-related reductions in state mindfulness was undertaken using Baron and Kenny’s 
(1986) 4-step methodology. Step 1 of the methodology was already established through 
the predictive relationship found between academic contingent self-worth and threat-
related reductions in state mindfulness in the regression reported above. In relation to 
Step 2, academic contingent self-worth was entered as the predictor variable and worry 
entered as the dependent variable in a regression model. Academic contingent self-worth 
was found to account for a significant amount of variance in worry (R2=.24, adjusted 
R2=.23, F(1,70)= 21.75, B=1.66, ß=.49, p<0.001) establishing Step 2. To test Step 3, 
academic contingent self-worth and worry were entered as predictor variables while 
threat-related reduction in state mindfulness was entered as the dependent variable in a 
multiple regression analysis. The two predictor variables accounted for a significant 
amount of variance in threat-related reduction in mindfulness (R2=.15, adjusted R2 = .13, 
F(2,69)=6.09, p<0.01). The partial regression coefficients showed that worry made a 
significant contribution to threat-related reductions in mindfulness after controlling for 
academic contingent self-worth (B=.14, ß=.26, t(69)=2.02, p<0.05)  establishing Step 3 
and partial mediation. With respect to Step 4, whilst the regression equation in Step 3 
showed that academic contingent self-worth was not significantly associated with threat-
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related reductions in mindfulness after controlling for worry, the standardised partial 
regression coefficient for academic contingent self-worth was not trivially small  (B=.35, 
ß=.19, t(69)=1.50, n.s.) suggesting that complete mediation could not be inferred. A 
subsequent one-tailed post hoc Sobel test found the reduction of the effect of academic 
contingent self-worth on threat-related reductions in mindfulness due to controlling for 
worry (the indirect effect) to be significantly greater than zero (Sobel’s statistic=1.86,  
p<0.05 (one-tailed)). The analysis therefore established statistical support for the 
mediating role of worry in the relationship between academic contingent self-worth and 




The study found that levels of academic competence contingent self-worth predicted 
reductions in momentary mindfulness (from neutral levels) following an academic ego-
threat. In other words, students whose self-worth was more contingent on academic 
performance and achievement showed greater reductions in state mindfulness when that 
contingency was threatened than students whose self-worth was less contingent on 
academic performance and achievement. These data are consistent with the theoretical 
proposal that external contingencies of self-worth act as inhibitory factors of mindfulness.  
As levels of academic contingent self-worth were not manipulated by the study it is not 
possible to directly infer that higher levels of academic contingent self-worth causally 
contributed to greater threat-related reductions in mindfulness. Nonetheless, the case for 
causality is made compelling by the finding that the academic ego-threat caused the 
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observed threat-related reductions in mindfulness and the likelihood that the impact of the 
academic ego-threat on participants was related to their degree of academic contingent 
self-worth. The findings accord with previous studies providing evidence of an 
association between external contingent self-worth and mindfulness (Brown & Ryan, 
2003, Brown & Kasser, 2005). However, the present study provides more stringent 
support for a causal link between the two constructs. 
 
The finding of statistical support for the mediating role of worry accords with Fennel’s 
(1997) cognitive model of low self-esteem in which the activation of dysfunctional 
assumptions (such as firmly held self-worth contingencies) by uncertainty over whether 
the terms of the assumption will be met leads to anxious thinking. In addition, the finding 
is consistent with increases in anxious thinking leading to an increase in conceptually-
driven processing and the observed reductions in mindfulness from neutral levels.  
 
As a theoretical implication, the study provides support for the salience of self-
investment in present-moment events as a controlling variable of momentary 
mindfulness. This is in accordance with the Buddhist account, outlined above, in which 
the conceptually-driven processing mode is primarily invested in evaluating events in 
relation to their impact on the self. This contrasts with the decentred processing mode 




From a clinical perspective, the study provides preliminary support for a complimentary 
avenue for enhancing mindfulness beyond the application of existing interventions used 
in current mindfulness-based treatments, namely the application of techniques to target 
clients’ firmly held external self-worth contingencies. Such techniques might include 
interventions to modify dysfunctional assumptions, as utilised in cognitive therapy (Beck, 
1976). Future studies could assess whether applying such techniques as an adjunct to 
existing mindfulness-based modalities leads to an incremental enhancement of 
therapeutic efficacy. 
 
The study has a number of limitations. First, the findings were based on a specific 
external domain in a relatively homogeneous sample. Future research could examine the 
effect of alternative domain-specific external contingencies of self-worth (e.g., 
appearance) on mindfulness in both non-clinical and clinical populations, to establish 
whether the findings generalize to other populations and other external domains. Second, 
the use of trait worry as a proxy for momentary level worry did not provide for an 
optimal test of the proposed mediational model. A replication of the study using a pre-
validated measure of momentary-level worry instead of the trait measure used would 
provide further insight into a mediating role for worry. Third, the support for the salience 
of self-investment in present moment events on momentary mindfulness was obtained by 
inducing a negative self-relevant event, and the study did not examine whether the 
findings generalized to other more positive self-relevant events. According to the 
Buddhist account (e.g., Brazier, 2003), self-investment can be inferred when an 
individual reacts to an event with feelings of attachment, as well as with feelings of 
 18
aversion. This would suggest that positive events that promote significant feelings of 
attachment (for example, perceiving a desirable object and wanting to possess it) would 
also lead to reductions in momentary mindfulness from neutral levels. Therefore, future 
studies could further examine the link between self-investment and mindfulness by 
exposing participants to positive events designed to induce feelings of attachment and by 
measuring subsequent changes in momentary mindfulness from neutral levels. 
 
A final limitation relates to the use of the state version of the MAAS to detect changes in 
the key dependent variable. The content validity of the MAAS has been criticised for its 
narrow conceptualisation of mindfulness in terms of attention to present-moment activity 
(Grossman, 2011). In contrast, Bergomi, Tschacher and Kupper (2013) recently identified 
at least eight other components of mindfulness that exist in the literature including non-
judgement/acceptance of experiences, non-reactivity to experience and insightful 
understanding. While the state MAAS measure does not include these putative features of 
mindfulness, it nevertheless captures what many believe to be the one of the construct’s 
key elements, namely attention to the present moment. As more comprehensive measures 
of state mindfulness emerge in future it may be possible to detect change in additional 
components of mindfulness in response to threats to self-worth contingencies. 
 
In conclusion this study has provided support for the proposal that cognitive factors 
linking self-worth to external outcomes act as inhibitory factors of mindfulness. It is 
hoped that the study will contribute to scientific accounts of mindfulness by providing 
preliminary support for an additional distinction between the conceptually-driven and 
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decentred processing modes determined by the respective primacy or absence of the 
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Means and Standard Deviations of State Mindfulness Scores by Condition, Condition 




 Condition        Condition                       Article Order Presentation 
                         order                Article A first                           Article B first            
 
Ego-threat         1st               10.00, SD=6.28, (N=22)         13.18, SD=9.58, (N=22)                                    
                          2nd              13.80, SD=8.27, (N=15)         11.62, SD=7.30, (N=13)   
 
Neutral              1st               18.72, SD=4.95, (N=22)         20.68, SD=5.45, (N=22) 
                          2nd              18.66, SD=7.20, (N=15)         18.03, SD=7.02, (N=13)                                    
 
 
 
